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An Exercise in Welfare Economics I
Par. I.A.1. Introduction
One uf the most important topics in literature on welfare economics is
the empirical search for the main determinants of the outcomes of the
interrelated social-economic and political processes and the desirabili-
ty to maintain them or not.
In particular "classical" welfare research devotes a great deal of at-
tention to the investigation of a social preference function, which is
supposed to be maximized by a policy decision making unit and opera[ing
on an urban, regional, national or international level. Within this line
of thinking, these decision units should aím ultimately at the maximiza-
tion of social welfare of the community, whatever this may be. Practical
"welfare" research-workers often suggest that there is enough empirical
evidence for the implicit or explicit existence of a preference func-
tion, which has been used for a more or less deliberately balanced set
of economic-political measures. Of course, the measures have been taken
within the framework of the side-conditions imposed by the concrete
structure uf the economic-political system at hand.
The afurestanding postulates are translated in an econometric way by the
use of a coupling of econometric models with empirically specified pre-
ference functions ín order to dispose of operational decision models.
However, many efforts have to be undertaken in order to overcome, or to
bypass the overwhelmíng technical problems and to get rid of the empiri-
cal determination of the preferences of the policy decision unit and its
transformation into a scalar preference function.
During the last decade we made such efforts off and on and tried to ex-
plicate implicit social preference functions for Belgium, France and the
Netherlands.l)
For tliis research we introduced our so-called Deterministic-Static-Im-
plicit-Determination-Model (DSID-Model) as a method of specifying a so-
cial preference function numerically.
Starting with a quadratic preference function (and after that with Cobb-
llouglas-type preference functions) in combination with a system of
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transformation functions we derived a system of equations expressing the
general first-order conditions for an optimum of quantitative economic
policy. Because the latter system is always underdetermined in the un-
knowns, we tried to get rid of this difficul[y by the use of a generali-
zed inverse after having normalized that system. Ultímately, our DSID-
method chooses in the hyperplane representing the degrees of freedom, a
poínt of minimum norm representing a Least-Least-Squares-Solution vec-
tor, of which elements are the numerically determined parameters of an a
priori specified preference function (see also paragraph I.B.2).
However, our aforementioned applications to the cases of Belgium, France
and the Netherlands still left a number of problems unsolved.2) The
first one is that the results were dominantly influenced by the
functional form and the arguments contained ín both the preference func-
tion and the side model. The second problem is of a more general nature
viz. that of the second order condítions. One way how the la[ter pro-
blems could be side-stepped is to consíder the trends only in the rela-
tive preference elasticities of a policy decision unit. If we accept the
íssue of the relative preference elasticity (see I.B.2) and its evolu-
tion over time as indicative of the evolutíon of implicit policy unit
preferences then we do not have to be bothered about the functional form
of the preference function. This is because it can be shown that there
always exists a function that will be maximized (see Appendix A).
The third problem is the most fundamental problem for econometrics as a
science: "How should econometrically founded decision models isolate in
a correct way the variables (and their numerical realizations in the
past) with regard to the true economic-political measures of the policy-
decision unit?" An elegant way to overcome thís latter problem may be if
we agreed to consider it for the time being in the laboratory of econo-
mic model-building (see paragraph I.B.1).
In order to explicate the aforestated problems in a more explícit way,
we intend to publísh two research-memoranda of which the paper at issue
is the first one.
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Par. I.A.2. The program of the paper
More or less in the laboratory of "roughly empirical" model-building in
"Tilburg"-style we develop ín par. I.B.1 our ideas about the functioning
of an open economic system and establish a linearly specified model.
Although the model permits a large measure of flexibility for the analy-
sis of different economic systems especially with respect to demand or
supply dominancy at the different markets to be distinguished, we con-
fine ourselves to the case of demand dominance at two markets.
For the sake of exercise in par. I.B.2 we can use this model for the
generation of ex post numerical results of the endogenous variables of
an ecunomic system in consequence of economic political measures that
have been taken by a policy decision unit. Besídes the model allows for
a correct and explicit specification of these measures shaping them by
the variables of automous pushes and pulls. After the analysis of the
dynamic properties of our "conjunctural-structural" (CS)-model in econo-
míc theoretical terms we can start in par. I.B.2 with our demonstration
how we can derive some important characteristics of the preference
structure underlying a preference function on which optimal economic
policy is assumed to be performed in the past.
After the formal explication of the assumed optimal quantitative econo-
míc policy problem we will explain [he main elements of our DSID-model
idea by:
1. establishing the Lagrange function;
2. assuming ex post knowledge of the numerícal values of target and in-
strumental variables;
3. using the Moore-Penrose inverse of a matrix and its numerical com-
putation;
4. deriving the relative preferences and relative preference elasticity
ratios corresponding to different observation horízons;
5. investigating on stability through time of the listed relative pre-
ference elasticity data making use of "orthogonal polynomial fitting"
and of the "analysis of variance";
6. a graphical shaping of the original DSID-model results with regard to
the Real Gross National Product-variable (as an íllustration).
4
The paper will be concluded by an evaluation of the results and with
notes and bibliographical references in par. I.B.3.
Finally a proof of existence of the global maximum of an objective func-
tion has been given in Appendix A.
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Par. I.B.1. The 'CS'-model for an open economy
In this paragraph we shall develop our ideas about the functioning of an
open economic system including a labour market and a product market. At
this stage we do not have accurate knowledge about the preference struc-
ture underlying a preference function on which optimal economic policy
is assumed to be performed by the policy decision unit of this economy.
The model to be developed will enable us to evaluate short run as well
as long run consequences of economic-political measures without ques-
tioning whether they are to be conceived of as optimal or not.
For the sake of the exercise in next paragraph we use the pure demand
model ídea with respect to the product market, but the labour market
operates under a more modest imperfect regime. The marketclearing func-
tion of prices on the product market is taken over by the rate of under-
utilization of national production capacity whereas the marketclearing
function of wages on the labour market can partly do his job and other-
wise is partly taken over by the rate of unemployment.3)
Note, however, that the model permits a large measure of flexibility for
the analysis of the consequences of demand or supply dominance at the
two markets, depending on the desíred particular situations at hand.
In order to avoid problems of non-linear model specification we shall
formulate the variables in our model in (percentage) terms of relative
difEerences with respect to their path of exponential or equilibrium
growth except for those of the balance of exports and imports and the
rate of utilization of national production capacity. Their relatíve díf-
ferences are expressed in terms of the equilibrium value of the Gross
National Product.
The symbols that stand for absolute values are denoted by '~', and the
subscript '0' relates to the equilibrium values of the variables. With-
out this subscript they relate to their actual values.
Exogenous variables have a dash underneath. So we define, x being the
real or actual value and x~ being the corresponding equilibrium value of
a variable, the relative (percentage) difference of x of the same varia-
ble in period t as:
6
xt-x0
xt - t . 100
x0
t
In the equilibrium neighbourhood the difference of xt is approximately
equal to the extra rate of grow[h of this variable with respect to the
preceding period4), i.e.:





Now we can formulate the model




2. The national capital stock is influenced by the effect of relative
differences in ínvestments yesterday:
aekt - K (it-l-kt-1) (I.B.lb)
3. Real investment today is determined by the national profit íncome
share today and the volume of the national capital stock today:
aR ~it - o YR f kt
t
4. Definítion of national profit i ncome share:
, - ~` ~
YR - - 1-a (wt)t
5. Definition of national labour income share:





6. Definition of na[ional income:
Yi - Y i- u0 ( Pe -Pm -Pw )
t pt t t t
7. Definition of labour income:





8. The real wage rate per worker today is determined by the level of
national employment today and by an exogenous wage push:
wt - BRC t ~t
9. Definition of na[ional production:
Y - x f spt t ut
(I.B.lh)
(I.B.li)
10. The balance of exports and imports is determined by the level of
national real spendings and the real exchange rate:
su - -u xt - u0n ( Pe -Pm -Pw )
t t t t
(I.B.lj)
11. National real spendings equal national real consumption and national
real investment:
xt - (1-o)ct f a it (I.B.lk)
12. National real consumption is determined by national labour income
and partially deríves out of profit income; moreover it is influen-
ced by an exogenous consumption pull:
~~ Y, 1
ct - YL YLt } R wt } 1-a Xt
13. Definition of the real wage rate per worker:
(I.B.11)
wt - PRt - PC (I.B.Im)
a
14. The nominal exchange rate and the import price level are fixed on
their equilibrium level; the export price level equals the internal
price level:
- 0 ; p - 0 and p - pPwt mt et t (I.B.ln)
15. Definition of the rate of utilization of national production capací-
ty in terms of equilibrium capacity:
-sb - Y - kt
t pt
(I.B.lo)
16. The internal price level today is determined by the nominal wage
rate per worker and the import price level yesterday; moreover by an
exogenous price push:
pt -(1-u)PAt-1 } u(pm tPw ) f p~t-1 t-1
Greek symbols stand for the following ratios and parameters:
a ~ i0~Y0
K - k0~Y0
~ - yL ~y00










- labour share of natíonal income
- capital share of natíonal income
~ elasticity of real wages with respect to national
employment
- import elasticity wi[h respect to national spend-
íngs
- investment elasticity with respect to the natio-




- consumption elasticity with respect to labour
income
- consumptíon (by the profit earners) elasticity
with respect to the real wage level
n - sum of import and export elasticities with res-
pect to [he real exchange rate
u0 - e0~y0 - m0~y0 -
export and import shares of total demand (- na-
tional production)
u - import price share of price formation
(1-u) - labour cost share of price formation
The model has 18 equations and 18 unknowns (apart from the pushes and
pulls) and thus is determined.
In the context of this exercise our special attention is turned to the
variables with respect to the profit share of national income yR ,
t
national production y, the balance of exports and imports su , natio-
pt t
nal labour income yL , national spendings xt and the ínternal price
t
level pt.
Hereafter we shall formulate three final equations of the model in terms
of [he labour income, the national spendings and the internal price
level variables and the relevant autonomous pushes and pulls. We can use
them for the analysis of the stability characteristics and the economic-
theoretical implications of the integral model. Moreover, they enable us
to calculate the numerical consequences for the other three variables
caused by economic-political measures which are shaped now as:
1. An incidental, but not permanent positive wage push, i.e.
~Rt - 1.44 i~ t ~ 1 .
2. A permanent positíve internal spending pull, i.e.,
x - 9.00 ~F t ~ 1 .-t -
lo
3. An incidental, but not permanent positive internal price push, i.e.,
pt - 3.00 8 t~ 1.
In this special case we make the choice for the numerical values of ra-
tios and parameters as follows:
a- 1~4 K- 2 a- 1~2 8- 2 u- 1~2 u0 - 1~2
aR - lI2 YL - 2~3 YR - lI6 n- 4~ u- 1~3
By means of substitu[ion the reduced forms to be derived are:
27 7 1
yL,t - yL,t-1 } yL,t-2 - PR,t - 16 PR,t-1 } 24 PR,t-2 } 2 Xt-1
1 7
- 3 Xt-2 - 4 Pt-1
1 79 5 4
xt - xt-1 } xt-2 - 6 PR,t - 72 PR,t-1 } 8 PR,t-2 } 3 Xt
(I.B.Iq)
- 19 X[-1 } Xt-2 - 6 ~t ( I.B.Ir)
2 19 2 1
pt - pt-1 } pt-2 - 3~k.,t-1 - 36 LR,t-2 } 9 Xt-2 } Pt - 3 pt-1
(I.B.Is)
It is note-worthy that these three reduced forms have the same charac-
teristic equations which are common [o all of the endogenous variables
of the model. Hence each of them is bound ín the linear difference equa-
tion system of our model and has the same characteristic roots and by
this all of them have the same ínherent stability, periodicity and am-
plitude (damping characteristics).
From our numerically specified characteristic equations with regard to
(I.B.lq)~(I.B.ls) it is easy to verify that we are dealing with a regu-
lar business cycle movement with a periodicity of six years and an am-
plitude value of (1)t - 1.
However, the partícular response time path of any endogenous variable
does not depend alone on the mentioned inherent response characteristics
of the system. It is extra determined by the particular sequence of the
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pushes and pulls beginning from a particular initial situation. Thís
circumstance causes the possibility of a different particular response
time path for each variable (see tables I.B.1.1~I.B.1.3).
Again, it is note-worthy that in our special case the exogenous stimuli
become constant over time after a particular adaptive initial situation
which results if the pushes or pulls start to operate as autonomously
impressed forces ín period 1, caused by the policy decision unit. In
mathematical terms it means that the particular solution for any endoge-
nous varíable, too, is constant and may be identified as a new equili-
brium or trend solution. In the tables I.B.1.1~I.B.1.3 it is of course
formulated in relative terms with respect to the original equilibrium
growth path solution of such a variable.
The analysis of the dynamic properties of our CS-model in economíc-theo-
retical terms can be more adequately performed by evaluation of the nu-
merical results summarized in the tables I.B.1.1~I.B.1.3.
Each of the three tables shows the consequences of a push or pull (the
last row) with respect to the three target variables y' , y andR,t p,t
su t(the first three rows) respectively to the three instrumental va-~
riables yL t, xt and pt (the intermediate three rows)..
For any variable the relative initial situation is, of course, a zero
situation (the first column). The columns 1 to 7 indicate the periodical
results for each variable after the moment that the relevant push or
pull is realized.
Adding up the values of six of these columns and again divíding them by
six, will yield the trend value of a variable as indicated in the most
right-side column of a table.
Although the mentioned three tables only review the particular responses
of a variable to one of the three individual autonomous impulses, it is
easy to understand how the corresponding results of simultaneous combi-
nations of these impulses can be calculated. For linearity of our CS-
model means that a símple adding-up procedure must be performed on the
same rows in two or three tables with regard to one and the same varia-
ble. For the sake of demonstration in next paragraph we actually did for
different combinations of trend-results (see columns t- 1 f 2 and t-






yp~t - su~t t xt
su t - -O.Sxt2.25Pt~
~yL,t - yL,t-1-yL,t-2 }
~
t~l 21
ÍER,t - 48 PR,t-1 } 72 PR,t-2
12
, xc ~ xt-l-xt-2} 72 Pk, t
' 79 45
- 72 PR,t-1} 72 PR,t-2
2
- pt-l-pt-2} 3 PR,t-1
19
- 36 Pk,t-2
Incidental, but not permanent, nominal wage push of 1.44 percent in period 1.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trend Case 1 a t a 1
0.00 -1.32 -2.68 -1.36 t1.32 f2.68 f1.36 -1.32 yR t- 0.00~
0.00 0.12 -2.71 -3.50 -1.46 1.37 2.16 0.12 yp~t --0.67
0.00 -0.12 -1.61 -1.72 -0.34 1.15 1.26 -0.12 su t - -0.23~
0.00 1.44 0.45 -1.56 -2.58 -1.59 0.42 1.44 YL,t -- 48 PQ,t ~-0.57
0.00 0.24 -1.10 -1.78 -1.12 0.22 0.90 0.24 xi -- 72 PQ t--0.44.
0.00 0.00 0.96 1.16 0.40 -0.56 -0.76 0.00 Pt - 36 P Q C' 0.20.
P~~t 0.00 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44 p K i- 1.44~
Table I.B.1.2.
Autonomous Impuls Permanent internal spending pull of 9.00 percent at the beginning of period 1.
ÍVariables
Period t -
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trend Case 2 ~ t- 2
yR t- yp,t t O.Spt - yL,t I 0.00 6.00 2.00 - 4.00 - 6.00 - 2.00
4.00 6.00 yR~t - 0.00
.
Yp,t - su,t t xt 0.00 6.00 6.50 1.00 - 5.00 - 5.50 0.00
6.00 yp~t - 0.50
s - -0.5x - 2.25p 0.00 -6.00 -6.50 -10.00 -13.00 -12.50 -9.00 -6.00 s - - -9.50u,t t t u,t
yL,t - yL,t-1 - yL,t-2 }
1 1
} 2 Xt-1 - 3 Xt-2
4
xt - xt-1 - xt-2 t 3 Xt -
- 19 Xt-1 } Xt-2
2
pt - pt-1 - pt-2 t 9 Xt-2
xt
0.00 0.00 4.50 6.00 f 3.00 - 1.50 -3.00 0.00 yL~t - 6 xt - 1.50
0.00 12.00 13.00 11.00 8.00 7.00 9.00 12.00 xt - 19 xt - 10.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 pC - 9 xt 5 2.00
0.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 xt ~ 9.00
Table I.B.1.3.
Autonomous Impuls Incidental, but not permanent internal price push of 3.00 percent ín period 1.
Period t -
U 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trend Case 3 4 t- 3
IVaríables -
yR t - y t } 0'SPt - yL t 0.00 -7.00 - 7.00 0.00 7.00 7.00 0.00 -7.00 yR t ~ 0.00, p, , ~
typ - su t } xt 0.00 -8.50 -14.75 -12.50 - 4.00 2.25 0.00 -8.50 y C --6.25, , P~
s --0.5x - 2.25p 0.00 -5.U0 - 7.75 - 5.50 - 0.50 2.25 O.UO -5.00 s --2.75u t. t t u r,
yL,t - yL,t-1 - yL,t-2
0.00 0.00 - 5.25 -10.50 -1U.50 -5.25 0.00 0.00 y --5.25-- 4 P7 L,t C
- 4 Pt-1
xt - xt-1 - xt-2 - 6 Pt 0.00 -3.50 - 7.00 - 7.00 - 3.5U O.UO 0.00 -3.5U xt - - 6. Et --3.50
pt - pt-1 - pt-2 } Pt
- 3 Pt-1 0.00 3.U0 5.00 4.00 1.00 -1.00 0.00 3.00 pt - 3 PC - 2.00
Et 0.00 3.00 3.UU 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 Pt ~ 3.OU
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Let us draw shortly a few conclusions with respect to the structural
effects of the mentioned autonomously impressed forces on our economic
system. The business cycle conclusions to be drawn wíll be left to the
reader.
Table I.B.1.1 deals a.o. with Trend Case 1 of an incidental but not per-
manent nominal wage push of 1.44 percent in period 1, from which it fol-
lows that it
- does not touch the profit income share,
- deteriorates national production because of deteriorizations of the
international competitive power and the national spending power.
Although the terms of trade have been ameliorated a little bit, the
competitive power has been worsened strongly caused by shift-off pro-
cesses which started to operate after the wage push was realized.
These shift-off processes explain why the internal price level has
been increased and the balance of exports and imports became negative.
- Finally, negative multiplier-accelerator processes can explain why
national labour income as well as national spendings have been worsen-
ed in the long run.
Table I.B.1.2 deals with Trend Case 2 of a permanent internal spending
pull of 9 percent from period 1 on and makes clear that
- again, it does not touch the profit income share,
- it ameliorates in a moderate way natíonal production but deteriorates
the competitive power and causes a permanent situation of excess in-
ternal spendings. By this the balance of exports and imports deterio-
rates enormously.
The worsening of the competitive power as well as the amelioratíon of
the terms of trade are again caused in consequence of shift-off
processes.
Table I.B.1.3 deals with Trend Case 3 of an incidental but not permanent
internal price push of 3.00 percent in period 1 and shows that
- still again, i t does not affect the profit íncome share,
- it deteriurates the competitive power in such a way that decreasing
national spendings cannot compensate the negative movement of national
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production. By this the balance of exports and imports deteriorates
considerably.
The negatíve development of the competitive power and its counter part
of a positive movement of the terms of trade are caused in consequence
of shift-off processes like we saw.
Last but not least it is worthwile to note that all the results, listed
ín the tables I.B.1.1~I.B.1.3, are consequences of positively valued
pushes and pulls. The symmetrical nature of the 'CS'-model will cause
the exact reverse results if these pushes and pulls had been valued in a
negative way and letting these values unchanged with respect to their
absolute magnitude.
Yar. I.B.2. A demonstration
In this paragraph we shall explain how we can derive some important cha-
racteristics of the preference structure underlying a preference func-
tion on which optimal economic policy is assumed to be performed in the
past. With the help of this símple example a demonstration can be given
how the theoretical DSID-model-idea is suitably used in order to find
the numerical values of relative preference elasticities during the
years of our horizon of investigation.
Within the theoretical framework of the model, used in the preceding
paragraph, the social welfare implications of the cyclical-structural
results generated by this same 'CS'-model of a national economy, are
investigated.
Three equations of the model are considered as the actually known con-
straints of an assumed optimal quantitative economic policy as has been
formalized in scheme (I.B.2a).
Taking account of the other assumptions that we stated already in fore-
going paragraph, we are able now to denote how the DSID-model procedure
wGrkS.
In order to detect the preference structure which is consistent with the
generated results in consequence of the mentioned wage push, internal
spending pull respectively the nominal price push and combinations of
these three possibilities, the assumed optimal quantitative economic




mt (yR,t' yp,t' Su,t' yL,t' xt' pt
~
yR,t - yp,t - yL,t } u0 (pe,t-pm,t
Yp~t - Su~t } xt
su t--L xt - U~n (pe t-Pm t), . ~
(I.B.2a)
setting: yD - 2; V- Z~ Pm,t - ~' Pe,t - pt ~t~...T and n-~




wt (YR t' Y t' su t' yL t' xt' pt), P, , .
~ 1
yR,t - YP.t
t yL~t - 2 pt - 0
yp~t - su~t - xt - 0
su t t Z xt t 4 pt - 0
.
(I.B.2b)
where YR t' y t and su t are conceived of as potentially relevant tar-, P, ,get variables whereas yL t, xt and pt may be considered in thís case as,
potentially relevant instrumental variables of economic policy.
From the Jacobian-matrix, to be derived from the constraints of
(I.B.2b), i t becomes clear that the conditíons of Appendix A are satis-
fied.
Establishing the Lagrange function and taking its first partial deriva-
tives with respect to YR,t' Yp,t' su,t' yL,t' xt' pt and the Lagrange
multipliers ai t(i - 1,...,3; t- 1,...T) yields:.
Lt -(ilt(YR~t, Yp~t, Su~t, YL~t, xt, Pt) -
, 1
- ~l,t(yR,t - yp,t } yL,t - 2 pt) -
- a2~t(Yp~t - su~t - xt) - a3~t(su~t t 2 xt t 4 pt)
d L dwt td yR't - d yR't - al~t.l - a2~t.0 - a3~t.0 - 0
d Lt dwt
d yP,t - d Yp~t
f al~t.l - a2~t.1 - a3~t.0 - 0
d L dwt t
6 su t - d su t- a1~t.0 f a2~t.1 - a3~t.1 - 0. ,
d L dwt td yL't - d yL't - al~t.l - a2~t.0 - a3~t.0 - 0
(I.B.2c)
d L dw
d xt - d Xt - a1~t.0 f a2~t.1 - a3~t.2 - 0
19
d p~ - dWpt t a1~t.2 - a2~t.0 -~3~t.4 - 0
,
daltt - yR,t - YP,t
f yL~t - 2 pt - 0
.
d Lt
da2~t - Yp~t - Su~t - xt - 0
ó L
da t - su,t t 2 xt
t 4 pt - 0
3, t
Ex pust knowledge of the numerical values of the target and instrumental
variables for every year t, enables us to single out the last three
equations of system (I.B.2c). Rearranging and writing thís system in
matrix-notation, we get:
1 0 0 0 0 0-1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 tl -1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 tl -1
0 0 0 1 0 0-1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 tl - 12





iwy (YD~t,Yp~t.su~t,YL~t.xt.Pt)I I ~
p,t
~















If we denote the 6x9-matrix of known elements by At, the 9x1-vector of
unknowns by ~ and the 6x1-nullvector by 0 we derive from ( I.B.2d):
20
In this special case At - A is a constant matrix of year t.
(I.B.2e) is underdetermined because the number
target variables exceeds zero. Normalizing this
equal to the arbitrary value of one we get:
~
At'Pt-gt
where At is the original
column and Pt is the
1 and inverting the sign.
yet unknown elements of
~3 t- 1; gt is the vector. resulting from multiplication of the last
column of the original matrix At by
~3 t-~
System (I.B.2f) can be solved for the as
8X1-vector Pr up to the arbitrary fixed
(I.B.2f)
the
base value of 1, usíng the
Moore-Penrose inverse of the matrix At denoted by Á, í.e., -
-, -~
Pt,u - At ~ gt (I.B.2g)
From (I.B.2d), (I.B.2e) and (I.B.2f) it is clear that we are dealing
with a consistent system because the ranks of the matríx At and AC are
of same order.
Therefore, we get the following general solution of this system:
where
min IIAC . ~t - ~112 - IIAt . p~ 0 - ~112 - 0 ( I.B.2h)~
~t
Pt.O - At . gt f(I - t At)rt (I.B.2i)
where rt is an arbitrary real-valued 8X1-vector and ~C~O is the 8X1
Least Squares Solution-vector.
The unique solution satisfying the minimum Euclidean norm is found by:
pC,u -
min 11~~0112 - ~ . ~
r
At-matrix of system (I.B.2d) without its last








where Yt~u is the 8X1 Least Least Squares Solution-vector.
The argumentation used above can be repeated for every year t(t -
1,...,T) where we select every time a Pt~u-vector. The ratio-values of
the first six elements of this vector expressed in terms of each other
denote the numerical values of the relative (marginal) preferences of
the target- and instrumental variables whatever the actual value of
~3,t ~ U ~t-1~.~~~T- If
we have performed the nwnerícal computation
for a number of years using the procedure explained elsewhere5), we can
test stability through time of the relative preferences and of the rela-
tive preference elasticities, where the latter can be derived from the
former as indícated ín the systems (I.B.2p) and (I.B.2q).
Let us turn to the numerical computation of At of system (I.B.2j) start-
íng from At of system (I.B.2f). We have already noted that our special
example yields constant At and At matrices ~t-1' "''T. This circumstance
considerably facilitates the computation.
The same is true because of the constancy of the gt-vector.
It means that we have to compute only one time t(t-1) and t.gt (t-1)
and these results can be used for getting pt~~ and pt~u of system
(I.B.2i) resp. (I.B.2j) for t - 2,...,T.
From ( I.B.2i) we derive:
~~-1,....T
p[ 0- At qt t(I-Att)rt - p~ - A}y t(I-AÁ)r, - -
(I.B.2k)
From (I.B.2j) it follows now:
t-1,...,T -, -, t
i~t ~t~u - min II~t~Ull2 - Át.qt -
-t
p~ - min Ilp~ll2 - Ág (I.B.21)
r
Using the arithmetical technique applied by Graybills) and starting from





1 0 0 0 0 ï? I
0 1 0 0 o u~I
0 0 1 0 0 0 I
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
whereas the seventh (and last) iteration results into:
Á -8
48~64 12~64 4~64 -16~64 4~64 8~64
12~64 39~64 13~64 12~64 13~64 - 6~64
4~64 13~64 47~64 4~64 -17~64 - 2~64
-16~64 12~64 4~64 48~64 4~64 8~64
4~64 13~64 -17~64 4~64 47~64 - 2~64
8~64 - 6~64 - 2~64 8~64 - 2~64 60~64
-16~64 12~64 4~64 -16~64 4~64 8~64
- 4~64 -13~64 17~64 - 4~64 17~64 2~64
(I.B.2m)
Matrix (I.B.2m) appears to be the Moore-Penrose inverse of the matrix
A, satisfying the four necessary and sufficient conditions of the
Moore-Penrose inverse-definition. With the help of this matrix we derive
for (I.B.2k):




















0 1 0 0 0 0 U 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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8164 - 6164 - 2164
-16164 12164 4164
- 4164 -13164 17164
48164 1'1164 4164 -16164
12164 39164 13164 12164
4164 13164 47164 4164
-16164 12164 4164 48164
4164 13164 -17164 4164
8164 - 6164 - 2164 8164
-16164 12164 4164 -16164
- 4164 -13164 17164 - 4164
-16164 4164 8164
12164 13164 - 6164
4164 -17164 - 2164
48164 4164 8164
4164 47164 - 2164
8164 - 2164 60194
-16164 4164 8164
- 4164 17164 2164
4164 8164 -16164 - 4164
13164 - 6164 12164 -13164
-17164 - 2164 4164 17164
4164 8164 -16164 - 4164
47164 - 2164 4164 17164
- 2164 60164 8164 2164
4164 4164 48164 - 4164












From (I.B.2o), using the definitions of relative preferences and expres-
sing them all in terms of marginal preference with respect to the in-
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The relative preference elasticities corresponding with system (I.B.2p)






E(wt(YÁ~t.YP~t.su~t.YL~t,xt.Pt)) - 66 ' pt
E(Pt)
E(wt(YR t'Y t'su t'YL txt'Pt)), P. , ~
E(Y ) YP.p,t 3 t
E(wt(YR~t.YP~t~su~t.YL~t.xt.Pt)) - 66 ' pt
E(Pt)
E(wt(YR t'Y t'su t'YL t'xt'Pt)). P, ~ ~
E(su,t) 17 su,t
E(wt(YÁ~t.YP~t.su~t.YL~t.xt~Pt)) - 66 ~ pt
E(Pt)
E(wt(YR t'Y t'su t'YL t'xt'Pt)), P. . ,











E(wt(YR t'y t'su t'YL t'xt'Pt)). P, , .
E(P ) P




If we know the observed values YR t'y t'su t'yL t'xt
and pt ~i-1,...,T
~ P. . ~
conceiving them to be optimal, we can calculate the numerical values of
the relative preference elasticities duríng the years of the observation
horizon consisting of T years by the use of system (I.B.2q). In our ca-
ses I and II indicated below, the observed average optímal values of the
target and instrumental policy-variables are generated by the "CS"-model
discussed in the preceding paragraph. However, in this example we do not
compare the relative preference elasticity ratios for every year belong-
ing to the same observation horizon, but now we want to compare the re-
lative preference elasticíty ratios correspondíng to different observa-
tion horizons, where the first three horizons are characterized by the
average results over the business-cycle time-track of the relevant poli-
cy-variables, denoted as Trend Cases 1, 2 and 3 in the tables I.B.1.1~
I.B.1.3 of the foregoing paragraph. The results are summarízed as case I
hereafter. The other three horizons are again characterized by mean
business-cycle results of which the fírst ones are those of Trend Case I
in table I.B.1.1, the second horizon is a combination of this latter
Trend Case and Trend Case 2 in table I.B.1.2, whereas the third horizon
has been composed by adding up the trend results for the sole relevant
policy variables as given in each of the aforementioned tables I.B.1.1~
I.B.1.3. The final results are summarized as Case II here below.
Actually, every horizon consists of infinitely repeated short-term busi-
ness-cycles of 6 periods. The averages of the short-term business-cycle
results constitute trendvalues, being average deviations from the ori-
ginal structural values as explained in the preceding paragraph. For the
only reason as we discussed at the end of this same paragraph the sign
of the results listed in the tables I.B.2.1 and I.B.2.3 has to be in-
verted if pushes and pulls had been valued in a negative way keeping
them unchanged with respect~otheir original absolute magnitude.
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Case I: Tables I.B.2.1 and I.B.2.2:
Table I.B.2.1.
Horizon t Trend Case of Trend Case of Trend Case of
Table I.B.1.1 Table I.B.1.2 Table I.B.1.3
Policy -
variables t- 1 t- 2 t- 3




















t- 1 t- 2 t- 3
(a') 0 0 0
(b') - 422.1~2772 t 31.5~2772 - 393.75~2772
(c') - 821.1~2772 -3391.5~2772 - 981.75~2772
(d') -1436.4~2772 t 378 ~2772 -1323 ~2772
(e') - 92.4~2772 t 210 ~2772 - 73.5 ~2772
(f') 1 1 1
E(a') - !;'~ 0 0 0
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variables t- 1 t- lf2 t- 1t2f3
yR,t 0 0 0
Yp~t -0.67 -0.17 - 6.42
s - -0.23 -9.73 -12.48u,t
yL t -0.57 t0.93 - 4.32- ~
x- -0.44 f9.56 t 6.06t
pt 0.20 f2.20 t 4.20






t- 1 t- lf2 t- 1f2f3
(a') 0 0 0
(b') - 422.1~2772 - 9.73~2772 - 192.6~2772
(c') - 821.1~2772 -3157.82~2772 -2121.6~2772
(d') -1436.4~2772 f 213.05~2772 - 518.4~2772
(e') - 92.4~2772 t 182.05~2772 t 60.6~2772
( f' ) 1 1 1










Investigation on stability through time of the relative preferences or
more likely of the relatíve preference elastícities as expressed in the
above tables turns out to be not so very difficult. The nature of [he
evolution over tíme of the few relative preference elasticity data with
regard to any target or instrumental variable becomes clear immediately.
'I'herefure it may not be worthwhile to test stabllity of the preference-
structure, for instance by the use of orthogonal polynomial fitting in
order to find a polynomial of low degree that "adequately" describes the
data.ó) In this exercise we are finally dealing with three observation
or determination periods (t-1,- 1t2,- lt2-F3), so a compromise between
the requirement for simplicity and the desire to get a good fit needs
not to be made here. Otherwise, in extensive data-cases we aim at a low
degree polynomial which satisfies the conditions of simplicity and of
being a"good" fit. The ultimate compromise to be made can be facili-
tated by the use of additional assumptions with regard to the distribu-
tion of the sum of squares of residuals (true errors) of the polynomials
to be fitted. Such particular assumptions may be ímply for instance that
the student-t distribution can be used to fix confidence intervals for
the partial regression coefficients of a fitted polynomíal of second or
higher degree. There are many other possibilities to make the ultimate
choice which we shall not discuss now.
But for the sake of completeness of our attempt to demonstrate our line
of approach with regard to the empirical investigations (using the DSID-
application model)~~, we shall fit below a linear and a quadratic poly-
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nomial in order to find a best "fit" with respect to the relative pre-
ference elasticity data of an arbitrary policy variable.
For this special case we will investigate the data concerning the Gross
National Production variable yp. These data are stated in the (b')-row
of Table I.B.2.4. The corresponding relevant polynomials are recorded in
Table I.B.2.5 whereas Table I.B.2.6 reviews the Analysis of Varíance of
the relative preference elasticity data. This latter table tells us that
the linear polynomial does not describe the data adequately.
Of course, in this special case the quadratic polynomial fits the data
perfectly. In general every (n-1)-degree polynomial always describes the
data (with respect to n observations) perfectly and will go through any
point.
Table I.B.2.5
Polynomials for Relative Preference Elasticity Data b' of Table I.B.2.4
t' - i




- -0.152 -9.73 - -0.003 -192.6 - -0.069i 2 2772 2772
pl -1 0 1 2
p2 1 -2 1 6
E b'
i - -0.075b' - n E(bi)2 - 0.028
n- 3 Eplbi - 0.082 Ep2bi --0.214
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Table I.B.2.6
Variance Analysís of Relative Preference Elasticity Data of Real Gross
National Product with respect to the Internal General Price-level
Variation Degrees of Sum Mean F-value P
Freedom Squares Squares a~ 0.05
Total 3 0.028
Reduction
for Mean 1 0.0169
Remainder
for Mean 2 0.0111
Linear 1 0.0034 0.0034 ~ 1 ~ S~
i
Error for
Linear 1 0.0077 0.0077
Quadr:~tic 1 0.0077 0.0077
Estimation of the parameters in the quadratic polynomial can be perform-
ed by the use of orthogonal polynomial fitting because we are dealing
with equally spaced x- t' (t' - 1,2,3) in the curvilinear model:
b' - a0 f alx f a2 x2 f e
For (I.B.2r) we derived:
(I.B.2r)
b' --0,515 t 0,47 t- U,107 t2 (I.B.2s)
It is easily verified that equation (I.B.2s) is a concave function gene-
rating perfectly the original DSID-model results wíth regard to the
relative preference elasticity of the Real Gross Natíonal Product-
variable for t- t- 1, lf2 and 1t2f3 as stated in Table I.B.2.4. Its
graphical shape has been represented in Figure I.B.
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Par. I.B.3. Evaluation, Notes and References
Apart from a short evaluation of the results already obtained in the
foregoíng paragraphs, we want to use these concluding remarks for the
derivation of some other results that may tell strongly in favour of our
DSID-approach to the measurement of stability of the revealed preferen-
ces of policy makers.
The first purpose of the paper at issue was to show within the límíts of
an exercise in the laboratory of ex ante model building, in what way the
DSIU-method delivers an acceptable ex post measure of the preference
structure of a policy decision unit. The implicit values of the relative
preference elasticities and especially their evolution through time have
to tell us that, if this policy decision unit took its decisions in cor-
respondence with the scheme of optimal economic policy, what would have
been the stability or instability of its intertemporal preference struc-
ture. In the latter sense it may give a better insight in the existing
instability in actual political relations if the DSID-application model
is applied for empirical investigation of the real world economic-poli-
tical outcomes. The present exercise denotes the critical border lines
within which one should compare ex ante politícal intentíons with ex
post revealed preferences. Thus we might deduce something about the ef-
ficiency and consistency of political activity. Our proposal of investi-
gating social preferences may perhaps contribute to a more profound ex-
plication of the real causes of long run and short run economic waves.
These causes probably are strongly related to an alternating dominance
in the course of time of different powerblocks to be distinguished in-
side a policy decision unit. Interdependence of the outcomes of such
interrelated social-economic and political processes and the question
about their desirability should [herefore always be accepted as legiti-
mate reasons in justification of those 'practical' welfare research-
workers who are perhaps fighting windmills.
To what extent we are 'beatíng the air' will be left to the reader of
the present paper.
Let us now evaluate the main results:
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(i) In Par. I.B.1 we established the 'CS'-model in order to isolate in a
correct numerical way the true economic-political measures of a po-
licy decision unit. Apart from the autonomous varíables with regard
to pushes and pulls, the concrete structure of the model can be qua-
lified as a system of 'monopoly capitalism'. The ígnorance of the
market clearing functíon of prices on the product market and the
assumption of a less imperfect labour market regíme refer to a domi-
nant powerblock of employers i nside the policy decision unit.
If we accept for a moment the pure hypothetical assumption of the a
priori knowledge of our 'CS'-model by the policy decision unit, the
perh~aps
mentioned powerblock of entrepreneurs wouldrnever accept the con-
sequences of the economic-political measures listed in the tables
I.B.1.1~I.B.1.3. Therefore, let us assume their wage policy, spend-
ing policy and price policy measures were opposite to those that
were analyzed in Paragraph I.B.1. In consequence of [he symmetrical
nature of the CS-model, all the simulated results would have got the
inverted sign, and by this the original negative conclusions on page
15 would become positive ones. If we now turn our attention to the
demonstration of the DSID-model procedure i n Paragraph I.B.2, we can
ímmediately verify that i t takes care of the insensibility to the
aforementioned opposite simulation situations of the relative pre-
ference ( elasticity) systems of ( I.B.2.p) and (I.B.2.q) respective-
ly. Therefore we may conclude that the preference structure, and
especially i ts stability through time to be revealed ex post by the
USID-model only depends on the explicitely known coefficients of the
ex post assumed side conditions of the optimal quantitative economic
policy scheme of (I.B.2.a), in combination with the calculated ra-
tios of the observed outcomes with regard to the target and instru-
mental variables. Within the theoretical frame-work of the present
exercise these outcomes were generated by the 'CS'-model and by this
latter circumstance the ex post revealed preference structure can be
compared with ex ante policy measures (- political intentions). It
is worthwile to note again that the reversibility of the 'CS'-model
results appears not to touch the series of ratio-values and thus it
lets the preference structure to be revealed unchanged if all the
policy-measures ( pushes and pulls) are valued ín a unique way.
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(2) From the two main cases I and II of which the numerical results have
been listed ín the tables I.B.2.1~I.B.2.4, we immediately derive
that all the six (five different) sítuations show values for the
relative preference elastícities which all together sum up to zero.
The latter result can easily be understood in mathematical terms. If
we denote the matrix of coefficients appearing in the side-condi-
tions of I.B.2b by Bt, its Null-space by N(Bt) and the range of its
~
transpose by R(BC), than it can be verified that vectors of the ob-
served optimal target and instrumental values are elements of N(Bt).
On the other hand, the first six elements of the P'-vector of system-u
I.B.2o composes a vector that belongs to the 'Range' space of the
~ ~
linear transformation Bt, i.e., is an element of R(Bt); N(Bt) and
~
R(Bt) are the orthogonal complements of each other and by this the
aforementioned two vectors are perpendicular in the Euclídean space
R6. By this their multiplication satisfies the condition
~
R(Bt).N(BC) - 0.
In 'welfare'-theoretical terms the sum-up-to-zero result must be
interpreted as a situation wherein the policy decision unit aims at
policy measures in the course of time which stabilize the optimal
welfare level in deviation of its equilibrium value on the path of
exponential growth. As we saw in paragraph I.B.1, this latter path
should be considered as the initial situation to be referred to for
the present evaluation.
If we consider again the tables I.B.2.2 and I.B.2.4, we derive for
the observed horizon of t- 1 that the ex ante wage policy measure
is translated into the revealed preference structure, saying that a
positive marginal devíation in the internal príce level must be com-
pensated by positive marginal deviations in the values of the other
target and instrumental variables and vice versa. To what extent the
aforestated 'welfare'-condition is statisfied by the individual con-
tribution of the different variables, is indicated by the 'trade-
off'-values listed in the (t - 1)-columns of the two tables.
Further investigation on how other ex ante policy measures and com-
binations of them are translated into revealed preference struc-
tures, can be based on the data from the other columns of the two
tables.
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A demonstration of such thorough investigation on the preference
structure as revealed by the aforementioned 'trade-off' values in con-
sequence oY' wage policy can tell us the following things about the view
of the policy decision authorities:
a) A 1~ extra increase of the internal price level relative to its
calculated new trendvalue (as listed in the tables I.B.2.1. and
I.B.2.3.)is offset by an analogue overall -1~- decrease of the other
instrumental and target variables and vice versa. Thís is true for
all of them other than the profit incorne- -share-variable. We do
not calculate the trade-off between the latter variable and the
other ones as the coefficients are zero or not sensible.
b) In the present case of theex ante known wage-policy measure it is
sensible to calculate the implicit trade-offs indicating, Ceteris
Paribus, which changes in the targets and instruments compensate
for an extra decrease of lq of the instrumental labour income value.
For horizon t- 1, it can be derived from the tables I.B.2.2. and
I.B.2.4. that these trade-off values are ~.40,-1.75 ,-15.54
and t0.51. They reflect marginal ameliorations of 3.4~, 1.75~ and
15.54~ with regard to the national production level, the balance of
exports and imports and the level of national spendings respectively,
whereas the price level should be rised by over 0.5~.
These latter results correspond very closely with the revealed
preference structure in consequence of the ex ante known price policy
measure (see table I.B.2.2. for t- 3). In summary we may conclude
that wage and price policy are revealed by the same preference
structure to be qualified as a consistent result in the present case
of monopoly capitalism!
The revealed preference structure in consequence of the ex ante known
spending-policy measure (see table I.B.2.2. for t- 2) indicates a
positive overall-trade-off of the policy variables with regard to the
target variable of the balance of exports and imports. An extra 1~-
decrease of the latter target value is offset by an extra 1~-increase
of the other variables (apart from the profit income-share variable).
This latter result can be seen again as consistent with the situation
of monopoly capitalism. The same is true for the revealed preference
structures of combinations of the three distinct policy measures as
can be derived from Table I.B.2.4. for t- 1 t 2 and t- 1 t 2 t 3.
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Only for the sake of completeness, we investigated on stabílity
through time for the individual trade-off coefficient with regard to
the National Product variable.
For the sake of shortness, the various conclusions to be drawn at
this stage, will be left to the reader.
(3) In technical sense the DSID-model has been strongly based on the
synthesís of the Lagrange and Moore-Penrose inverse techniques. This
way of doing can be justified on three grounds:
a) It selects a unique vector of some relative preferences whatever
the actual value of the 'numéraire' an ~ 0 may be.
In the present exercise a3~t - 1 implies that the marginal pre-
ferences with regard to the target variables all together sum up
to 1 as can be verified from I.B.2o. By this it will be reason-
able to assume that the condition a~ 0 has been satisfied.n
b) The DSID-application model ultimately wants to test stability
through time of the relative preference elasticities. Orthogonal
polynomial fitting and other statistical tests can be based on
solutions which are very sensitive to variations in the known
parameters of the DSID-system which biases them against the H~-
hypothesis of invariability.
c) It uses Graybill's computing formula for the Moore-Penrose in-
verse that appears to be the best one in terms of accuracy and
speed of computation. (We refer to note 5. hereafter.)
(4) The present exercise still leaves a number of problems unsolved.
Some of them will be solved in the second paper that we promised in
the introduction paragraph.
In the present paper we showed how the DSID-approach takes care of
the situation wherein the results are not influenced anymore by the
a priori functional form of the preference function. Moreover, the
problem of the second-order conditions have been side-stepped by the
introduction of a peculiar concept of the relative preference (elas-
ticity). All this will be admissible if one can prove that there al-
ways exists an objective function that will be maximized by a policy
decision unit. This latter proof has been given in the Appendix A.
37
Notes
1. See the bibliographical references, numbers 5 and 6.
2. A good overview of these problems are stipulated in the bibliographí-
cal references, numbers 7 and 8.
3. Referring to the introduction and to the bibliographical reference,
number 9, it becomes clear that we are dealing with a modest form of
monopoly capitalism.
4. The exact relationship can be expressed as:
fXt-xt-1~xt - 1 -
X
C-1
xOt - xOt-1} {100 t xt-1}
x0 x0 ,x0t-1 t t-1
5. We refer to the bibliographical references, numbers 2, 3, 5 and 6.
The procedure whích we used, has been based on the same Graybill's
computing formula for a g-inverse that appeared to be the best one in
terms of accuracy and speed of computation from the point of view of
Kymn c.s.
6. See the biblíographical references, numbers 1 and 4.
7. See the introduction paragraph.
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Appendix A: Proof of existence of a global maximum of an objective func-
tion of the optimizing problem of quantitative economic po-
licy and its inverse.
Establishing the theoretical and the DSID-application-model for deriva-
tion of the trends ín the relative preference elasticíties, considering
them as indicative of the evolution of implícit social preferences, we
suggested problems of the second-order conditions could be side-stepped
(see par. I.B.2 and the bibliographical references, numbers 5 and 6).
Hereafter we will give the proof of existence of the global maximum of
an objective function of the postulated optimizing problem of quantita-
tive economic policy and its inverse. The proof boils down to show under
what circumstances ex post satisfaction of the first order Lagrange-con-
ditions is necessary and sufficient to an objective function will be
maximized, without bothering about its functional form.
Proof: Suppose a maximizing problem of mathematical programming can be
formalized as follows:
maxlm(Yj~zk),
where j- 1,...,J; k- 1,...,K and (yj,zk) e W' ;
JfK lwhere W' - {(Yj,zk) e R , fl(Yj,zk,vi) - Of
where i - 1,...,I
1 - 1, ..,N
N - J f I
yj (j-1,...,J), zk (k-1,...,K) and vi (i - 1,...,I)
(A.a)
denote respectively the target, instrumental and írrelevant endogenous
variables of the economíc model fl (yj,zk,vi) ~ 0(1 - 1,...,N).
Let x - (yj,zk,vi)
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f( x) - 0 f: R~K i RN
R~K ~ W - {x~f(x) - 0}
í2(f,w) the set of optimal solutions.
(A.b)
Acceptance of the ex post approach, we are dealing with the inverse of
problem (A.a), i.e., the realized values of the variables yj, zk and vi
are known and conceived of as results of scheme (A.a); so they are op-
timal values:
f(x0) - 0 x0 e R(f,w) .
Let
(1) f be continuously differentiable in the neighbourhood of x0,
(2) r(Df (x0)) - N; i.e., the functional matrix
D f(x0) is full-ranked.
If (1) and (2) are satisfied, we can say:
there exists a neighbourhood U of 0 e R~K
and a neígbourhood V of x0 e R~K for which there exists a diffeomorfism
(bijection) g:
g : U i V
so that
(1') 8(~) - XO
(2') ~x e V n W: g-1(x) -(P1,...,PK,O1,...,ON)
where Oi (i - 1,...,N) are null-valued scalars,
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so x - g(P1,...,PK, 01,...,ON).
If x e V n W there exists a function h:
h ;
RNfK ~ ~ RK
with
and
h(P1,...,PK, 01,....ON) - (P1,...,PK)
h 1(P1,...,PK) - (P1,...,PK, 01,....ON)
h o
g-1 : V n W~ RK~
h o g-1(x) - (P1,...,PK)
RK i V n W
g o h-1 : RK i V n W
Example: Suppose a maximizing problem of mathematical programming can lie
formalized as (A.a) with j- 1,2,; k- 1,2 and i- 1,2.
Instead of (A.a) we derive (A.c):
max~m(Y1.Y2.zl.z2)~
where (Y1.Y2.zl~z2) E W~
(A.c)
W' z z )~(y z z) e R4 f(y ,y ,z ,z ,v ,v )- 0}
-{(Y1'y2' 1' 2 1'y2' 1' 2 ' 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
(1 - 1,...,4)
(N - Jtl - 4)
Instead of (A.b) we deríve (A.d):
Let x - ( Y1~Y2.zl~z2~~1,~2)
42
f(x) - 0 f : R6 ~ R4 (A.d)
R6 ~ W - {x~f(x) - 0} .
In the ex post approach we are dealing wíth the inverse of problem
(A.c), i.e., [he realized values of the variables yl, y2, zl, z2, vl and
v2 are known and conceived of as results of scheme (A.c); so they are
optimal values:
XO E SZ(f,W) .
Let
(1) f be continuously differentiable in the neighbourhood of x~;
(2) r(D f(x~)) - 4; i.e., the functional matrix D f(x~) is full-ranked.
If (1) and (2) are satisfied, we can say:
there exists a neighbourhood V of x~ e R6 and a neighbourhood U of
0 e R6 for which there exists a bijection R:
g : U a V
so that
(1') S(0) - XO
(2') i~x E V n W: g 1(x) -(P1.P2.D.U~U~U).
so
x - 8(P1~P2.~.~.~.~).
If x e V n W, there exists a function h:
h : R6 ,~ i R2
h(P1,P2,0,0,0,0) - (P1,P2)
h 1(P1.P2) - (P1.P2.~,~~~.~)




h o g-l~x) - iP1.P2)
R2 i V fl W
g o h 1: R2 -~ V r` W.
Graphlcal pres?ntation of the example:
V,1W
Rb ~ W ~ t x ~ f (x) ~ 0}
i
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